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This paper addresses the issue of systemic risk and ﬁnancial
regulation. More speciﬁcally, it looks at the interaction between
two issues at the heart of systemic risk and successful ﬁnancial
regulation that have been neglected in the regulation literature.
The ﬁrst is associated with how effectively the regulatory frame-
work is implemented and the second is how the regulated institu-
tions react to the framework and its implementation.
A number of recent papers, such as Brunnermeier et al. (2009),
Volker and Frenkel (2009), and Acharya and Richardson (2009),
have highlighted the vulnerability of the overall ﬁnancial system
overseen by a regulatory framework based on micro-prudential
regulations designed for regulating individual ﬁnancial institu-
tions.1 In this discussion,2 three aspects have been identiﬁed as par-
ticularly important. The ﬁrst is associated with the procyclicality
problem whereby prolonged periods of low volatility reduce statisti-
cal measures of risk and encourage excessive risk taking, which thenrebounds when times get bad and generates excessive risk aversion.3
The second is cross-sectional and arises because banks are intercon-
nected, either directly from operations such as interbank lending,4 or
indirectly, through common exposures linked to individual diversiﬁ-
cation strategies.5 The third refers to liquidity and maturity mis-
matches via funding liquidity combined with adverse asset price
movements due to low market liquidity (Acharya and Schnabl,
2009), or reliance on short term market ﬁnancing to fund long term
assets (Hellwig, 2008).6
The regulatory discussion of how these issues can be addressed
has identiﬁed a number of promising policy instruments and high-
lighted some of the major problems associated with policy choice
and implementation (Brunnermeier et al. (2009), Volker and
Frenkel (2009), and Acharya and Richardson, 2009). Proposed pol-
icy instruments range from pro-cyclical capital ratios that incorpo-
rate liquidity risk to insurance policies and recapitalizationand Shin
Dasgupta
r (2010).
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ments or combination of instruments would be most effective in
reducing systemic risk and weighing their merits against their eco-
nomic cost with respect to ﬁnancial efﬁciency and innovation and
how effectively they can be applied. The question of effective appli-
cation is especially relevant for an industry that has a long and
illustrious track record of capturing its regulators. This paper pro-
vides a framework for analyzing these aspects of regulatory efﬁ-
ciency and costs.
It starts from a micro-prudential framework and analyzes the
effectiveness of the framework in terms of the trade-off between
the productivity and stability of the system. It builds on the intui-
tion that the effectiveness depends crucially on how the regime is
perceived and how those perceptions impact the expectations and
decisions of the regulated economic agents. As perceptions change,
expectations change with consequent effects on decision making.
For example, a strict regime that is perceived to be inefﬁciently
managed will generate expectations that lead to a set of decisions
that can be far different from those that would be taken if the
regime were perceived to be efﬁciently managed. As the regime
reveals itself over time, perceptions and expectations adjust and
decision-making evolves accordingly. The main innovation is that
the effect of endogenous expectations ﬁgures explicitly in the
analysis.
Adopting the now standard representative agent framework,7
we develop a rational expectations model with an endogenous con-
ﬁdence term to analyse the effect of the credibility of discretionary
regulation on the stability and productivity of the ﬁnancial system.
In this framework bank proﬁts represent the productivity of the
ﬁnancial system, proﬁt volatility represents the system’s stability
and the object of regulation is the rate of change of the size of the
bank’s balance sheet.8 We start with the base case and look at
whether or not and to what extent, a perfectly credible, perfectly
executed, costless regulatory policy aimed at reducing ﬂuctuations
in the size of bank balance sheets can improve the tradeoff between
bank proﬁts and proﬁt volatility. We ﬁnd that regulation generally
yields substantial reductions in proﬁt volatility with no loss in the
level of proﬁts themselves, but the effectiveness of regulation
decreases exponentially as regulation is relaxed. Importantly, we
also show that for inherently volatile banks very tight regulation
can drive the volatility of net income below that of banks that are
inherently less volatile. This counter-intuitive effect of regulation
on the volatility of the banking system highlights the importance
of regulatory credibility and suggests that the potential gain from
ﬁnancial regulation is greater in the inherently riskier ﬁnancial
systems.
In a second step we relax the assumption of costless implemen-
tation and introduce credibility as a cost in the sense that the costs
of regulatory enforcement will be higher in a less credible system.9
When regulation entails costs, we ﬁnd that the reduction in volatility
is diminished with respect to perfect, costless regulatory interven-
tions and the reduction in volatility that is achieved comes at the
expense of lower proﬁts. Furthermore, this negative effect on proﬁts
is most pronounced at the tightest regulatory bands where costless,
perfect intervention is most effective.
In step number three, we relax the assumption of perfect inter-
vention. We consider two types of imperfect intervention that
reduce credibility: (1) To capture the effect of regulators not7 The representative agent implies perfect procyclicality and cross sectional
correlation.
8 For the sake of generality, we focus on the whole balance sheet but the
framework we propose can be applied to individual elements of the balance sheet to
accommodate speciﬁc regulatory instruments, such as liquidity and capital ratios.
9 For example, when the regulatory system is perceived as credible, intervention
dictats will be observed with a minimum of oversight. When it is perceived as less
credible more oversight is required.intervening when they should or intervening when they should
not, we allow costs to be random; (2) To capture the effect of reg-
ulators mis-timing their intervention by intervening too early or
too late, we allow the timing of the intervention to be random.
We ﬁnd that random costs reduce the effectiveness of regulation
by reducing proﬁts for each unit of proﬁt volatility. We also ﬁnd
that increased regulatory uncertainty stemming from imperfect
timing of regulatory intervention, reduces both the stability and
productivity of the ﬁnancial system. Again, this negative effect
on proﬁts and volatility reduction is most pronounced at the
tightest regulatory bands where costless, perfect intervention is
most effective.
Finally, in one of the most interesting contributions of this
paper, we use the tradeoff between proﬁts and volatility to estab-
lish a link between optimal intervention policy and the regulator’s
attitude towards risk. We show that in the presence of less than
perfect credibility, there is no universal optimal intervention policy
rule. The optimal regulatory system depends on the regulator’s
level of absolute risk aversion. High levels of risk aversion are asso-
ciated with tight regulation and frequent intervention while low
levels of risk aversion are associated with light regulation and
infrequent intervention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
develop the model. In Section 3 we solve the model and analyse
its parameters. Section 4 contains the results of the simulations
and Section 5 gives our conclusions.
2. The model
Consider the representative banking group with total assets q(t)
ﬁnanced by equity k(t), private deposits d(t), and borrowing from
the central bank b(t), such that q(t) = k(t) + d(t) + b(t). Using the
performance model based on return to total assets and the follow-
ing notation:
D(t) = net income
m = return on assets
a = the investment coefﬁcient (the increase in total assets per
unit increase in expected net income)
/(t) = the information set at time t
net income can be represented as a function of m, q(t), a, and the
expected change in net income:
DðtÞ ¼ mqðtÞ þmaE½dDðtÞ=/ðtÞ
dt
ð1Þ
where E is the expectation operator. The expected change in net
income, E½dDðtÞ=/ðtÞdt , is the endogenous conﬁdence term conditioned
on the information set at time t.
Eq. (1) says that net income is equal to the return on assets mul-
tiplied by total assets (mq(t)) plus the return on assets (m) multi-
plied by the increase in assets (a) induced by the expected
increment in net income E½dDðtÞ=/ðtÞdt
 
.
Rearranging (1) gives:
E½dDðtÞ=/ðtÞ
dt
 1
ma
DðtÞ ¼ 1
a
qðtÞ ð2Þ
Integrating (2) with respect to dt gives:
DðtÞ ¼ 1
a
Z 1
t
e
ðstÞ
ma E½qðsÞ=/ðtÞds ð3Þ
It is clear from Eq. (3) that the variable that drives net income is
the expected size of the representative bank’s assets and that reg-
ulating the banking system involves regulating the expected size of
the representative bank’s assets. In practice, regulation typically
focuses on the composition of the bank’s balance sheet rather than
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such as risk linked capital requirements and liquidity ratios, ulti-
mately determine the size of the bank system’s balance sheet. In
this paper, we are concerned with how the speciﬁc regulatory sys-
tems, laws and procedures are perceived rather than with the spe-
ciﬁc systems, laws and procedures themselves.10 Thus, in the
interest of expository simplicity, but with no loss of generality, we
focus on the effect of regulatory policy on the size of the balance
sheet rather than on the details of regulation policy itself. With this
in mind it is important to remember that more complicated policies
are more difﬁcult and costly to implement and administer.
In the simple system summarized in Eq. (3), one possible policy
would be to determine the optimal level of credit and target
directly the level of the bank’s total assets. The obvious problem
with this type of policy is that it is very restrictive and its useful-
ness to the real economy depends on the ability of the regulator
to accurately determine what the optimal amount of credit should
be. A more realistic and less restrictive policy would be to let the
market forces in the economy determine the underlying supply
and demand for credit and have the regulator maintain the stabil-
ity of the system by controlling how fast credit can expand or con-
tract. Under this policy, regulators time their interventions based
on the rates of change of total assets rather than on their levels.
Consequently, in our model, the variable that is the object of the
authority’s policy intervention is the rate of change of the bank’s
total assets. Let:
f ðtÞ ¼ dqðtÞ
dt
ð4Þ
Suppose that in the absence of regulatory intervention, f(t) fol-
lows a process of arithmetic Brownian motion:
df ðtÞ ¼ adt þ rdzðtÞ ð5Þ
where a is the drift parameter, r is the standard deviation of df(t),
and z is a Weiner process with E[dz(t)] = 0 and E[(dz(t))2] = dt. The
parameter r can be interpreted as the intrinsic volatility of the
banking system.
Integrate (4) and take expectations:
E½qðTÞ ¼ qðtÞ þ
Z T
t
E½f ðsÞds ð6Þ
Put (6) into (3):
DðtÞ ¼ 1
a
Z 1
t
e
ðstÞ
ma qðtÞ þ
Z T
t
E½f ðuÞdu
 
ds ð7Þ
In Appendix A we show that the solution to (7) is given by:
DðtÞ ¼ mqðtÞ þm2af ðtÞ þm3a2aþ A1ek1 f ðtÞ þ A2ek2 f ðtÞ ð8Þ
for some parameters A1, A2 determined later. In Appendix A we
show that k1 > 0 and k2 < 0. The ﬁrst three terms represent the
normal movement in net income without regulatory intervention
and the last two terms represent deviations from the market path
due to intervention.
3. The intervention technique
Regulatory intervention can be introduced by placing upper and
lower limits on f(t) with intervention occurring as the rate of
change of total assets approaches one of these limits.11 In this case,10 For example, the existence of banks deemed ‘‘too big to fail’’ reduces the
credibility of the regulatory system.
11 The intervention technique in this stylized model involves using central bank
credit b(t) to regulate q(t). For example, suppose a reserve ratio of 10% and no leakage
from the system. If b(t) changes by 1, q(t) will change by 10. Of course, in practice
other types of intervention, such as changes in capital requirements, are perfectly
compatible with the model.the evolution of f(t) becomes regulated Brownian motion and the
smooth and continuous nature of the interventions implies perfect
and timely policy implementation.
Introducing regulatory intervention into the model is straight-
forward using standard techniques. The constants A1 and A2 can
be solved from the smooth pasting conditions:
@D
@f
¼ 0 ð9Þ
@D
@f
¼ 0 ð10Þ
where f represents the upper limit and f represents the lower limit.
Differentiating Eq. (8), evaluating the derivatives around the
upper and lower limits, and solving the system gives:
A1 ¼ m
2a
k1
ek2f  ek2 f
ek1
fþk2 f  ek1 fþk2f
" #
ð11Þ
A2 ¼ m
2a
k2
ek1 f  ek1f
ek1
fþk2 f  ek1 fþk2f
" #
ð12Þ
where A1 < 0 and A2 > 0.
With A1 and A2 thus deﬁned, the effects of the model’s four
economic parameters, m, a, a, and r, and two regulation policy
parameters, f and f , on net income, D, can be determined.
Increases in m, a, and a have a positive effect on net income
whereas r does not ﬁgure directly in the solution. It ﬁgures indi-
rectly through its effect on changes in f(t). The effect of f and f is
to keep D within a certain range of its long term equilibrium path.
The smooth pasting conditions insure that the transition from one
point to another within this range is smooth and continuous.
Thus f and f represent regulation policy guidelines and the
smooth pasting conditions represent perfect and timely policy
implementation within these guidelines.4. Results
4.1. Parameter values
Simulating the model involves rewriting it in discrete time
and determining the parameter values as well as the starting val-
ues for the endogenous variables.12 We want to analyze the effect
of regulatory credibility on the trade-off between net income and
the volatility of net income, where the volatility of net income rep-
resents the stability of the banking system. In the absence of reg-
ulation, the volatility of net income (the actual volatility of the
banking system) depends directly on the intrinsic volatility of the
banking system (r).13 To concentrate on how regulation affects
this trade-off, we consider a bank with no growth so that a = 0
and set the other parameters relatively high. For the return on
assets we let m = 0.15; for the standard deviation of the change
in the change in total assets we let r = $100 (1.5%); and for the
investment coefﬁcient a = 5 with an investment horizon of
T = 10 years.14 We set f(0) = 0 and q(0) = $6667 so that
D(0) = $1000.12 Appendix B develops the discrete simulation model.
13 The volatility of net income is ðm2r2q þm2ar2dtÞ
1
2 where r2q is the variance of q.
14 This represents the cost of an investment that yields $1 dollar of net income every
year for 10 years in the formula:
a ¼ $1ð1þmÞ1 þ $1ð1þmÞ2 þ . . .þ $1ð1þmÞT
a ¼
XT
t¼1
$1ð1þmÞt
Table 1
Initial parameter values.
a m a r T n f(0) q(0)
5.0 0.15 0 100 10 500 0 6667
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band with f ¼ f and f 2 f1;2; . . . ;1g. Thus, the intervention band
ranges from 2 to inﬁnity with T = 10 and n = 500. Table 1 summa-
rizes the initial parameter values.0%
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Fig. 1. Financial regulation and net income volatility.
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Fig. 2. Financial regulation and elasticity of net income volatility.4.2. Perfect, costless regulatory intervention
The ﬁrst simulation deals with the case of perfect, costless reg-
ulation. Fig. 1 shows the different volatility levels for a wide range
of intervention bands. We can see that discretionary intervention is
most effective in reducing income volatility at very tight interven-
tion bands (up to about plus or minus 3.5%). As bands growwider it
becomes less and less effective. Another way of looking at this phe-
nomenon is in terms of elasticities. Fig. 2 shows the elasticity of
volatility reduction with respect to the intervention band. At a
band of plus or minus 4.7%, volatility becomes inelastic. Thus, we
conﬁrm the potential beneﬁts of regulatory intervention. This
result is unsurprising given the assumption of perfect and costless
intervention. What is interesting, however, is the observation that
regulation is most effective when bands are smallest and interven-
tion is most frequent.
When we let the parameters vary, other interesting things hap-
pen. Fig. 3 shows that higher levels of return on assets (m) or the
investment coefﬁcient (a) increase the volatility of net income at
all intervention bands. Given that banks can increase their return
on assets and their asset base by reducing their capital require-
ments, this shows that a system of highly leveraged banks (high
investment coefﬁcients and high return on assets)15 is relatively
more volatile (less stable) than a system with higher capital require-
ments. Interestingly, it is also less sensitive to regulatory interven-
tion. When r varies, however, the effect is different. Remember
that r represents the intrinsic volatility of the system. In Fig. 4 we
see that tighter bands are more effective when r is higher. In fact,
surprisingly and counter-intuitively, over a relatively long interval,
regulatory intervention actually drives the volatility of net income
for higher levels of r below the volatility for lower levels of r. The
reason for this counter-intuitive effect is that at high levels of r rel-
ative to the intervention band, the intervention effect on the
expected change in total assets overwhelms the effect of stochastic
movements within the band. In other words, for a given level of f,
at higher levels of r the probability is higher that one of the limits
will be reached, thereby triggering intervention by the regulator.
Thus, banks anticipate intervention and mitigate their investment
behavior more than they would if r were lower. This counter-
intuitive effect of regulation on the volatility of the banking system
highlights the importance of regulatory credibility and suggests that
the potential gain from ﬁnancial regulation is greater in the inher-
ently riskier ﬁnancial systems. We address the choice of the optimal
regulatory system in Section 4.5.4.3. Perfect intervention with regulatory enforcement costs
In practice, regulatory intervention is not costless. There are the
ﬁxed costs of gathering information and monitoring the banking
system on a regular basis. The more frequent the interventions,
that is, the smaller the intervention band, the higher the ﬁxed costs
will be. There are also the variable costs encountered when an act
of intervention actually takes place. These costs accrue in the form
of transaction costs associated with policy implementation and
enforcement and the costs of compliance for the regulated bank.
They reﬂect the credibility of the system as private agents react
to the intervention. When the regulatory system is perceived as
credible, intervention dictats will be observed with a minimum15 Here we assume that higher leverage increases the return on assets.of oversight. When it is perceived as less credible more oversight
with the associated costs is required. With this in mind, we focus
on the variable costs associated with each intervention and assume
that all regulatory costs accrue to the representative bank. We let
intervention costs range from a low of 1% of expected net income
to a high of 5%. First, we look at the effect of intervention costs
when intervention is perfect. In a second step, we look at the
effects of bungled policy and timing imperfections.
Suppose that the variable cost per intervention is equal to c. The
instantaneous cost, C(t), is then given by
CðtÞ ¼ c½1 I½f ;f ðf ðtÞÞ
where I½f ;f ðf ðtÞÞ is an index with a value of 1 when f(t) is inside the
intervention range and a value of 0 when intervention takes place.
Over the whole investment horizon total intervention costs will be
equal to
Total cost ¼
XT
t¼0
CðtÞ ¼ c T 
XT
t¼1
I½f ;f ðf ðtÞÞ
" #
Total cost is equal to the cost of an individual intervention mul-
tiplied by the number of actual interventions.
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Fig. 3. Financial intervention and net income volatility effects of the investment-
return (ma).
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Fig. 4. Financial intervention and net income volatility effects of intrinsic volatility.
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Fig. 5. Financial intervention and net income effects of intervention costs.
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Fig. 6. Financial intervention and net income volatility effects of intervention costs.
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Fig. 7. Financial intervention and elasticity of net income volatility: Effects of
intervention costs.
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vention bands when c = 50, that is, 1%, 3%, and 5% of expected
proﬁt. Remembering that in the absence of costs, the average level
of net income is 1000 for all intervention bands, it is clear that
intervention costs cause a substantial fall in the average level of
net income – the higher the cost, the higher the fall. The fall is also
most pronounced when bands are small and intervention is fre-
quent. This result is obvious since it is a straightforward conse-
quence of the deﬁnition of proﬁts and how costs are calculated.
However, what is interesting and less obvious is that intervention
costs also have a similar adverse effect on income volatility. Fig. 6
compares volatility levels for different costs and different interven-
tion bands. Volatility is higher in the presence of costs – the higher
the costs, the higher the volatility. The effect of costs on volatility is
also most pronounced when bands are smaller and intervention is
more frequent. We can conclude that transactions costs reduce
expected proﬁtability as well as the effectiveness of intervention
in reducing volatility. Furthermore, the cost effects occur in the
interval where costless intervention is most effective in reducing
volatility and it is a clear example of the tradeoff between produc-
tivity (measured as net income) and volatility due to intervention.
In terms of elasticity with respect to the intervention band, Fig. 7
shows that volatility is most sensitive to changes in intervention
at tighter levels of the effective intervention interval.Now consider the case when costs themselves are random. An
example of a situation of this type would be when the intervention
is timely but the policy is inappropriate, e.g. limits on certain types
of loans are imposed when, in fact, capital requirements should be
increased. In this case the costs are equal to the transaction costs
associated with policy implementation and enforcement and the
988
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cost=5%
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Fig. 8. Tradeoff between income level and net income volatility effects of constant
and random intervention costs.
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epsilon=0.5%
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Fig. 9. Financial intervention and net income volatility effects of imperfect
intervention.
16 In simulations not reported here but available on request, the concavity also
increases with imperfect intervention.
17 As an example of risk aversion, consider a twice differentiable concave utility
function, u(D). Pratt (1964) showed that the intensity with which an individual
dislikes the uncertainty he faces can be measured by u00ðDÞ=u0ðDÞ. This measure is
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Fig. 8 compares the tradeoff between average net income and vol-
atility of net income when transaction costs are constant at c = 50
and when they are random with the following probability
distribution:
P½c ¼ 25 ¼ 1=3
P½c ¼ 50 ¼ 1=3
P½c ¼ 75 ¼ 1=3
such that E[c] = 5% – the average random cost is equal to the con-
stant cost. In Fig. 8 we can see that there is a double negative effect.
Net income is lower than it would be if costs were constant and vol-
atility is higher.
4.4. Imperfect, costless intervention
Suppose now, that instead of perfect policy implementation
there is a chance that the regulator will intervene a little too early
or a little too late. This amounts to introducing a white noise, e, sur-
rounding f and f so that the intervention will take place at f þ ~e
and f þ ~e. For the sake of simplicity let ~e have the following prob-
ability distribution:
P½~e ¼ þe ¼ 1=3
P½~e ¼ 0 ¼ 1=3
P½~e ¼ e ¼ 1=3
The smooth pasting conditions then become
D0ðf þ ~eÞ ¼ 0
D0ðf þ ~eÞ ¼ 0
and the constants of integration are
Ai ¼ AiðeÞ i ¼ 1;2
where
A1ðxÞ ¼ m
2a
k1
ek2ðfþxÞ  ek2ðfþxÞ
ek1ð
fþxÞþk2ðfþxÞ  ek1ðfþxÞþk2ðfþxÞ
" #A2ðxÞ ¼ m
2a
k2
ek1ðfþxÞ  ek1ðfþxÞ
ek1ð
fþxÞþk2ðfþxÞ  ek1ðfþxÞþk2ðfþxÞ
" #
Fig. 9 compares the results of imperfect intervention with the
case of perfect intervention for different levels of the intervention
band for two levels of e. Imperfect intervention clearly increases
volatility at all intervention bands up to 4% – the more imperfect
the intervention (the larger is e), the higher is the volatility. How-
ever, the effect is most pronounced over the interval where inter-
vention is potentially the most effective.
Table 2 summarizes the foregoing results.4.5. The optimal level of intervention
The foregoing discussion makes it possible to shed some light
on the question of whether or not there is an optimum interven-
tion level and, if there is, what it should be. When there are no
costs associated with intervention, that is, when intervention is
perfect and costless, the answer is straightforward. The optimal
intervention band is the smallest intervention band. However, in
the more realistic case where costs are present and/or intervention
is imperfect, the optimal intervention band is situated somewhere
between the smallest and no intervention at all. If we adopt the
standard representative agent framework in mean–variance space,
the optimal intervention level depends on the regulator’s attitude
towards risk. The more risk averse the regulator, the smaller the
intervention band and vice versa. Consider, for example, the case
of perfect intervention with constant intervention costs. In Fig. 8
we saw that there was a concave tradeoff between average net
income and risk (volatility) reduction and that the concavity
increases when costs are random.16 Let k represent the economy’s
level of absolute risk aversion.17 To ﬁnd the optimal band, we can
maximize the function E(D)  kr(D). As we can see in Fig. 10, the
optimal intervention band, given by f , is found at the point of tan-
gency of the straight line kr(D) with the curve determined by the
ensemble of points (E(D), r(D)).called absolute risk aversion.
Table 2
Summary of simulation results.
Perfect and
costless
@EðDÞ=@f ¼ 0 orD/om > 0 E(D) = 1000 Intervention effective in reducing volatility without affecting average output
orD/oa > 0 Effectiveness increases as the economy’s inherent volatility increases
@rD=@f > 0
orD/orf < 0
Perfect with
costs
@EðDÞ@f > 0 @rD=@f > 0 E(D) < 1000 Intervention lowers average output and is less effective in reducing volatility
oE(D)/oc < 0 orDoc > 0 Higher costs decrease expected output and increase volatility
Randomness in costs increases volatility
Imperfect
without
costs
@EðDÞ=@f ¼ 0 @rD=@f > 0 E(D) = 1000 Intervention effective in reducing volatility without affecting average output but less effective than
perfect and costless. The more imperfect the intervention, the less effective it is in reducing volatility
orD/oe > 0
Imperfect
with costs
@EðDÞ=@f ¼ 0 @rD=@f > 0 E(D) < 1000 Intervention reduces expected output and is less effective in reducing volatility than imperfect costless.
The more imperfect the intervention, the less effective it is in reducing volatility
orD/oe > 0
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implications. The practical implication is that there is no universal
optimal regulation policy. The optimal policy varies according to
the risk aversion of the regulatory authority. If we then make the
plausible assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, we can
argue against a common regulatory system for all countries.18
The argument is that because of decreasing absolute risk aversion,
lower income countries have higher levels of risk aversion and thus
are willing to sacriﬁce ﬁnancial productivity for a reduction in sys-
temic volatility while higher income countries are willing to accept
more systemic risk in exchange for higher ﬁnancial productivity.
5. Conclusion
In this article we have shown that when regulatory intervention
is perfect and costless, the potential rewards in terms of reduced
systemic volatility to be reaped from discretionary ﬁnancial regu-
lation are considerable. The rewards are greatest where the bands
are smallest and for banking systems with the highest inherent
volatility. In fact, surprisingly and counter-intuitively, over a rela-
tively long interval, intervention actually drives systemic volatility
for economies with higher intrinsic volatility below the systemic
volatility for economies with lower levels of intrinsic volatility.
The reason for this counter-intuitive effect is that for a given level
of the rate of change in total assets higher levels of intrisic volatil-
ity increase the probability that one of the limits will be reached,
thereby triggering intervention by the regulator. Thus, bankers
mitigate their investment behavior more than they would if intrin-
sic volatility were lower. Ceteris paribus, this effect highlights the
importance of regulatory competence and credibility and suggests
that appropriate, stringent regulation can be advantageous for
intrinsically risky banking systems.
Another interesting result is that under the plausible assump-
tion that higher leverage increases the return on assets, we show
that higher levels of return on assets (m) and/or a higher invest-
ment coefﬁcient (a) increase systemic volatility at all intervention
bands. Given that banks can increase their return on assets and
their asset base by reducing their capital requirements, this is evi-
dence that a system of highly leveraged banks (high investment
coefﬁcients and high return on assets) is more volatile (less stable)
and less sensitive to regulatory intervention than a system with
higher capital requirements.18 Decreasing absolute risk aversion means that ½u00=u0 0 < 0. Taking the derivative
and rearranging gives u00=u0 < u000=u00 . We recognize u000=u00 as the measure of
absolute prudence. Thus, for absolute risk aversion to be decreasing, absolute
prudence must be greater than absolute risk aversion. Since u00=u0 is positive, this
means that u000 must be positive as well.When intervention costs are present, the price of reduced vola-
tility is a reduction in net income. The reduction in net income is
greatest just where the rewards from reduced volatility are the
highest. Furthermore, when intervention costs are random, the
potential for volatility reduction is substantially diminished. The
potential for volatility reduction is also diminished when the tim-
ing of intervention is imperfect. In all cases, the price is highest just
where the potential for volatility reduction is also the highest.
Finally, and most importantly, we show that when intervention
costs are present, there is no universal optimal regulatory policy.
The optimal regulatory policy, measured as the intervention band,
depends on the economy’s level of absolute risk aversion. This
result looks like an avenue with many practical implications that
should be fruitfull for further research.
Appendix A
Starting from Eq. (7) in the text:
DðtÞ ¼ 1
a
Z 1
t
e
ðstÞ
ma qðtÞ þ
Z T
t
E½f ðuÞdu
 
ds ð7Þ
The integral in the brackets follows a Brownian motion so it can
be written as a function:
h½f ðtÞ ¼ 1
a
Z 1
t
e
ðstÞ
ma ds
Z T
t
E½f ðuÞdu ðA:1Þ
The other part of the integral reduces to mq(t) so that (7)
becomes:
DðtÞ ¼ mqðtÞ þ h½f ðtÞ ðA:2Þ
Differentiate (A.2) and apply Ito’s Lemma:
E½dDðtÞ ¼ mdqðtÞ þ h0½f ðtÞadt þ 1
2
h00½f ðtÞr2dt ðA:3Þ
Take (A.3) into (1) and simplify:
DðtÞ ¼ mqðtÞ þm2af ðtÞ þmaah0½f ðtÞ þmar
2
2
h00½f ðtÞ ðA:4Þ
Take (A.4) and (A.2):
mar2
2
h00½f ðtÞ þmaah0½f ðtÞ  h½f ðtÞ ¼ m2af ðtÞ ðA:5Þ
Solving (A.5) gives:
h½f ðtÞ ¼ m2af ðtÞ þm3a2aþ A1ek1 f ðtÞ þ A2ek2 f ðtÞ ðA:6Þ
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Fig. 10. Optimal band with intervention costs and risk aversion.
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roots to the quadratic equation in k:
mar2
2
k2 þmaak 1 ¼ 0
k1; k2 ¼ maa
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
m2a2a2 þ 2mar2p
mar2
Finally, substituting (A.6) into (A.2) gives the expression in the
text.
Appendix B. The simulation methodology
Simulating the foregoing model involves rewriting it in discrete
time. The discrete time version of the Brownian motion for f(t) is:
Df ðtÞ ¼ aDt þ r~y
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
Dt
p
ðA:7Þ
where ~y follows the standard normal variate and the discrete time
version of (4) is:
DqðtÞ ¼ f ðtÞDt ðA:8Þ
We use the initial values of f and q, f(0) and q(0), and the normal
variable ~y to generate the other values of f and q and net income D.
We start with: the interval [0, T], f(0), q(0), the model’s parameters,
m, a, a, and r, the intervention parameters f and f and n, the num-
ber of ‘‘observations’’ in the interval. Let Dt be the length of the
interval divided by the number of simulations: Dt ¼ Tn ¼ D. The
value of f for each period can then be written as19
f ðiDÞ ¼ f ðði 1ÞDÞ þ aDþ r
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
D~y
p
i for i ¼ 1;2; . . . ; n ðA:9Þ
Therefore
qðiDÞ ¼ qðði 1ÞDÞ þ f ðði 1ÞDÞD for i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ðA:10Þ19 To get a value for f we have to simulate y1, y2, . . ., yn. For this we draw two
uniform variates, x1 and x2, from 0, 1. Deﬁne y1 and y2 by
y1 ¼ cosð2px2Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2 lnðx1Þ
q
y2 ¼ cosð2px1Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2 lnðx2Þ
q
Then y1 and y2 are independent standard normal variables.The discrete time version of (8) thus becomes
DðiDÞ ¼ mqðiDÞ þm2af ðiDÞ þm3a2aþ A1ek1 f ðiDÞ þ A2ek2f ðiDÞ
for i ¼ 1;2; . . . ;n ðA:11Þ
where the Brownian motion oscillates between f and f . Thus, in our
simulation, when the calculated value of f is higher (lower) than
f ðf Þ, we set the simulated value equal to f ðf Þ.
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